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This paper  asks  whether  q theory must  be  modified  to  take account of 
financial structure by  analyzing a q model  of investment  in  which  financial 
structure affects  firm  value.  The  model  is a perfect foresight model  of 
general  equilibrium similar to  that of Brock  and  Turnovsky  (1981),  except  that 
there is a debt-related agency  cost.  The  combination of the agency  cost and 
taxes  that favor  debt yields an  interior solution for the debt-to-equity 
ratio,  which  varies endogenously.  We  find that although q is influenced by 
financial structure, it  is still a "sufficient statistic" for investment. 
However,  the model  implies that analyses  which  ignore the endogenous 
adjustment  of  financial structure will systematically err in  predicting 
investment. 
To  illustrate these points,  we  examine  the comparative  statics and 
dynamics  of changing the corporate  tax rate.  An  unanticipated increase  in  the 
corporate tax rate lowers  the cost of capital.  The  presence  of  real agency 
costs,  however,  may  cause  the capital stock  to  decline. TOBIN'S  Q,  INVESTMENT,  AND  THE  ENDOGENOUS 
ADJUSTMENT  OF  FINANCIAL  STRUCTURE 
I. Introduction 
Analyses  of the link between  financial markets  and  the investment 
decisions of firms have  generally differed between  the fields of 
macroeconomics  and  finance.  Macroeconomic  analyses  of investment now  focus  on 
the relation between  Tobin's q and  the rate of investment.  In the field of 
finance,  analyses  tend  to  focus on  the relations between  the cost of  capital, 
firms'  value,  and  firms'  financing decisions  in  the presence of capital market 
imperfections.  These  latter analyses  typically describe financing decisions 
by  the  1  everage or  debt-to-equi  ty  ratio. ' 
Most  q models  (for example,  see  Abel  and  Blanchard  C19831,  Hayashi  C19821, 
or Von  Furstenberg  C19771)  assume  that neither the market  value of  a firm  nor 
its cost of capital is  affected by  the decision of how  investment  is 
financed.  Analyses  of  capital market  imperfections (see  Bradley,'  Jarrell , and 
Kim  C198411,  on  the other hand,  fail to  provide insight about  the dynamic 
relation between  financial structure and  investment.  In  this paper,  we 
investigate whether  q theory needs  to  be  modified to  take account of financial 
structure. 
The  failure of q to  perform well empirically is  another  source of 
motivation to modify q theory.  Although q theory  implies that past  values of 
q  should not matter  in  a regression of investment rates on  current and  past q, 
most  empirical  tests (see  Abel  and  Blanchard  C19831,  Hayashi  C19821,  or Von 
Furstenberg  C19771)  find that current q  has  low explanatory power  and  that 
residuals are highly correlated.  These  empirical results suggest  that we 
examine  1  inks between  financial markets  and  investment  other than q. In  this paper,  the debt-to-equity ratio affects firm  value and  is 
determinate,  lying between  0  and  infinity.  The  optimal  debt-to-equi  ty  ratio, 
chosen  by firms,  is  determined by agency  costs of  debt  together with tax rates 
favoring  debt.  The  agency  cost of debt arises from the presence of  bond 
covenants  and  other legal or institutional restrictions on  firms.  Jensen  and 
Meckl ing (1976)  and  others have  shown  how  agency  problems  may  be  related to 
financial  structure.  Tax  rates favor debt  issue,  since  corporate  interest 
payments  are  tax-deducti  bl  e for firms.  Differences between  the personal 
income  tax rate,  the capital gains  tax rate,  and  the corporate  tax rate have 
a1 1 been  cited as  determinants  of an  optimal  financial structure for  firms  and 
tax cl  ientel  es  among  investors  (see  Mi  1  ler C19771).  Reasonable  values  for a1 1 
three tax rates  imply that tax rates favor debt over  equity. 
The  model  uti  1  izes frameworks  developed  by  Abel  and  Blanchard  (1  983)  and 
Brock  and  Turnovsky  (1981).  In  this dynamic,  general  equilibrium model  of 
savings  and  investment,  the relation between  investors'  portfolio decisions 
and  the decisions of firms is clearly exposed.  The  link between  households 
and  firms is the cost of capital,  driven by  the rates of return required by 
households.  Firms,  facing tax rates favoring debt,  and  a cost of  debt,  choose 
the debt-to-equity ratio in  order  to  to  minimize the cost of capital. 
Variations  in  tax rates or in  the interest rate affect the trade-off  between 
debt and  equity and,  thus,  the optimal  debt-to-equity ratio. 
We  find  that even if financial structure affects firm  value,  q is  a 
"sufficient  statistic" for investment.  Thus,  unlike Chirinko (1987),  we 
conclude  that financial structure does  not explain the poor  performance  of 
Tobin's q.  Financial  structure affects q,  however,  because  q is the present 
discounted  value of  after-tax marginal  products  of capital and  because  the 
discount rate (cost of capital  1 varies with the debt-to-equi  ty  ratio.  Indeed, the endogenous  adjustment  of financial  structure has  real effects.  For 
example,  when  interest rates rise,  firms offset part of the effect on  the cost 
of  capital  by  increasing the debt-to-equity ratio to take advantage  of the 
interest-deductibility of debt.  This  implies that models  ignoring real 
effects of financial structure will systematically err in  predicting 
investment. 
In  addition,  one  factor that may  potentially break  the  link between 
marginal  q and  investment  is  uncovered.  Unanticipated changes  in  the 
corporate tax rate may  cause  marginal  q and  investment  to  move  in  opposite 
directions.  The  comparative  statics and  dynamics  of an  unanticipated change 
in  the corporate  tax rate are analyzed  to  demonstrate  the significance of the 
endogenous  adjustment of financial  structure. 
11.  Description of the Model 
The  model  is  a variant of the perfect foresight models  of general 
equilibrium of Abel-Blanchard  (A-B>  and  Brock-Turnovsky  (B-TI.  Following B-T, 
I  indicate the way  in  which  consumers'  demand  for savings  influences  the cost 
of capital.  The  appropriate form for the cost of capital is  determined 
explicitly from the firm s assumed  objective.  The  incorporation of adjustment 
costs  in  the model  is  in  the spirit of  A-B.  Costly financial  structure 
provides  the unique  link between  financial markets  and  real decisions. 
The  model  consists of three sectors:  consumers,  firms,  and  government. 
Because  all consumers  are assumed  to  be  identical,  the analysis is  conducted 
in  terms  of a representative consumer.  Similarly,  all firms are assumed  to  be 
identical,  and  the corporate sector is  aggregated  to  a single firm.  Both  the 
consumer  and  the firm  are infinitely lived and  solve explicit maximization 
problems  by making  forecasts of variables relevant to  these  decisions.  I assume  that all expectations or forecasts are fulfilled,  that all markets 
clear,  and  that all supply and  demand  functions of  firms and  households  are 
derived from maximizing  behavior under  perfect competition. 
The  consumer  saves  in  the form of  either bonds  or equities.  Being 
concerned only with rates of  return on  alternative assets,  the consumer's 
problem  implies that if debt and  equity are  to  coexist,  then after-tax rates 
of  return must  be  equal.  Since  the returns are equal,  the consumer  would  seem 
to  be  indifferent about  the debt-to-equity ratio.  The  firm,  however,  is  not 
indifferent about  the debt-to-equity ratio. 
The  firm  maximizes  its  market  value by choosing sequences  of notional 
demands  and  supplies.  Given  a set of financial/accounting constraints,  market 
value maximization  is  equivalent to  maximization of a particular present 
di  scounted  value.  The  di  scount  rate i  ncorporates  the rate of  return requi  red 
by the consumer,  the tax rates facing the consumer  and  the firm,  and  the 
agency  cost of debt.  Because  of the presence of an  agency  cost and  a tax 
structure that favors debt,  there is  an  optimal  debt-to-equity ratio which 
minimizes  the cost of capital and  lies between  0  and  infinity.  Without  the 
agency  cost,  the optimal  debt-to-equity ratio would  be  0  or infinity, 
depending on  the  tax rates. 
The  government  sets the tax rates T,,  T,,  and  T,,  and  consumes 
consumption  goods,  but issues no money  or debt.  The  government  income 
statement  identity requires that the lump-sum  tax T  vary endogenously. 
111.  The  Structure 
A.  The  Consumer 
The  utility  of the consumer  is  a function only of consumption:  there is  no 
di  suti  1 i  ty  associated with labor.  The  firm  determines employment.  Individual consumers  view themselves  as  unable  to  influence the  size of the lump  sum 
tax.  The  household's  objective is to  choose  the  sequence 
{ct,  bz,  E;),  t =  CO,  m) 
to  solve 
m 
(1)  MAX  S e-"U(ct)dt 
0 
subject to 
(3)  lim  get bt -  >  0, lim  get ztEt 2 0, 
t-  t- 
and 
(4)  bt=o =  bo,  EL0  =  Eo. 
ct =  real private consumption 
tt  =  real employment 
bt =  demand  for real corporate bonds 
Et =  number  of shares  of equity demand 
z,  =  relative price of equity in  terms  of output 
wt  =  real wage  rate 
st =  real  interest rate on  private bonds 
r, =  tax rate on  capital gains 
r,  =  tax rate on  wage  and  interest income 
r  =  lump  sum  tax determined  as  residual  from government  income  identity 
d  =  dividend pay.out rate:  =  D/zE 
D  '= real dividends 
I3  =  rate of time discount 
8  =  rate of return on  consumption,  defined below The  utility  function U(ct)  has  the usual  concavity properties:  U1(  > 
0,  U"(  <  0,  U1(0) =  Expression  (2) is the intertemporal  budget 
constraint facing the consumer.  Income  is  received as  labor  income,  interest 
income,  dividend income,  and  capital gains.  Labor,  interest,  and  dividend 
income  are taxed at the rate T,.  Capital  gains  are taxed at the rate 
2,.  All capital gains  and  losses on  equity are immediately realized. 
With  this income,  the household  consumes  or purchases  bonds  or equities. 
Expression  (3) states  that the values of debt and  equity are bounded.  All 
bonds  mature  instantaneously.  Expression  (4)  states initial conditions on  the 
stock of debt and  equities,  The  outcome  of this optimization problem will be 
sequences  of notional demands,  where  unambiguous t  subscripts are omitted. 
This problem  leads  to  the formulation of the following Hamiltonian: 
(5)  H  =  e-"  U{[(~O+~b~+dzE~)(l-r,)-  T,~E~  - bd - zid - TI  +  a(bd) + ((id)) 
where  a and ( are the costate variables associated with b and  E, 
respectively. 
If both debt  and  equity are to  be  held by  the household,  then after-tax 
rates of return must  be  equal.  The  existence of  both debt and  equity wi  11  be 
optimal  for the  firm  and,  hence,  both assets  wi  11  be  held by  the household. 
This  implies that condition (6)  will hold: 
(6)  ~(1-T,)  =  8 =  (~-T,)z/z  +  d(1-2,). 
8  is  the rate of  return on  consumption:  8 =  13  - U,,c/U,. 
B.  TheFirm 
The  firm  maximizes  the market  value of  debt  plus equity at time t =  0, 
V,=,  =  bt,o  +  zt,oEt,o.  Given a set of financial  and  production 
constraints,  and  numerical  values  for KO, bo, and  Eo,  maximizing VtZo is  equivalent to  maximizing a particular present  discounted  value.  This 
equivalence  is demonstrated  in  appendix  A.  The  appropriate discount rate or 
cost of capital is  determined by  this equivalence.  These  constraints are: 
(7)  y




d  =  real labor demand  by  the  firm 
K
d  =  real capital  demand  by  the firm 
n =  real gross  profits 
6  =  exogenous  rate of depreciation 
b
s 
=  real supply of corporate bonds 
X =  bIzE,  the debt-to-equity ratio 
y
s =  real output,  the supply of  goods 
q(  1 =  adjustment cost of  investing 
a(X)b  =  cost of  maintaining the bond  portfolio 
RE =  retained earnings 
E
s  =  real supply of equities 
2, =  corporate tax rate 
Expression  (7)  is a production function with positive but diminishing 
marginal  productivi  ties and  constant returns to scale.  Expression  (8)  defines 
real gross profits as  revenue minus  the wage  bill and  adjustment  costs 
associated  with gross  investment.  Expression  (9)  indicates  that gross profits 
go  to  bondholders  as  interest,  to  the government  as  taxes,  to  stockholders  as dividends,  into retained earnings,  or are absorbed  by  the agency  cost. 
Dividends  are paid out at a fixed rate d.  Interest payments  are deducted  from 
taxable income.  Expression  (10)  states that all investment must  be  financed 
through retained earnings or debt  issue.  There  is  no equity issue,  although 
there is  an  initial stock of equity,  Eo.  Expression (11)  states that all 
investment  is  net investment or replacement  investment where  depreciation 
occurs at a constant rate 6.  There  is  no  deduction for depreciation. 
Expression  (12)  states the initial conditions for capital,  equity,  and  debt. 
The  adjustment  cost q(I,K)  is  deducted  from taxable income,  since 
increases  in  the rate of investment  draw  resources of the firm  away  from 
productive activities.  The  adjustment  cost function q(I,K)  is  assumed  to 
be  1  inearly homogenous  so  that it  can  be  written as  h(I/K)I  with the 
properties h(0)  =  0,  hl(O>  >  0,  2h1(  +  (I/K)ht(  1  >  0.  This  is similar to 
formulations of adjustment  costs proposed by  Hayashi  (1  982)  and  others. 
The  cost a(X)b  is  assumed  not to  reduce output by  drawing on  productive 
resources.  While only the interest rate on  debt  is tax-deductible,  the gross 
cost of  debt  to the firm  is Cs  +  gtX)lb.  The  size of the firm  does  not 
affect this cost directly,  but the firm's value does.  If the firm's value 
increases due  to increases  in  equity share prices,  the debt-to-equity ratio 
fa1 1s.  For  a given firm  value,  increases  in debt  lead to  an  increase  in  the 
agency  cost. 
This cost is  best viewed  as  an  agency  cost.  Smith and  Warner  (1979)  point 
out that the existence of  bond  covenants  can  be  viewed as  a method  of 
controlling the conflict between  bondholders  and  stockholders.  It is assumed 
here  that bond  covenants  succeed  in  eliminating the conflict,  and  thus 
firm-value maximization,  rather  than equity-value maximization,  is  the proper 
firm  objective. Bond  covenants  typically restrict debt  issue.  Without  such  restrictions, 
stockholders  would  issue more  debt and  incur greater agency  costs.  For 
example,  it  may  be  that the incentive for stockholders  to  shift  to 
higher-variance  investment  projects increases  with the  face value of  debt (see 
Barnea,  Haugen,  and  Senbet  C19851).  If such  a shift decreases  the  total value 
of  the firm,  then bondholders,  anticipating such  actions,  would  demand  higher 
interest rates.  The  increase  in the  interest rate demanded  by  bondholders  is 
a type of agency  cost.  Here I  assume  that bond  covenants  are negotiated to 
restrict the level of  debt,  for a given  value of  equity.  The  higher  the 
debt-to-equity ratio,  the more  1 ikely that the covenant  wi  11  be  violated, 
resulting in  restrictions on  investment activities and  a decrease  in  firm 
value.  Thus,  the cost of issuing b units of  debt  increases  with the 
debt-to-equity ratio. I  assume  that a(0)  >  0,  a'( 1 >  0,  and  a"(  1  >  0. 
Appendix  A  demonstrates  how  expressions  (7)-(12)  can  be  used  to  derive 
expression  (13): 
Y, the cash  flow,  is  defined as 
r, the cost of capital,  is defined  as 
Now  the firm's problem is to  choose  the  sequence  Kt,  c:,  bs) 
a - SiT(z>dz 
(16)  MAX  J'e  Y( t1dt 
0 
subject  to  =  KO, btZo  =  bo. Note  that Y  is  solely a function of "real" variables  Kt  and It, 
whereas  r is a function of only "financlal"  variables summarized  by 1,. 
These  considerations  imply that the  firm  can  optimize in  the following 
sequence:  first,  choose  K:  and It  to  maximize  Y(t),  then  choose 
At  to  minimize  T(t). 
If a(X)  =  0,  the firm  would  choose  X as  follows: 
(17)  set X =  rn if  (1 =  T,)  >  (1 - ~,)(l  - T~) 
(18)  set X =  0 if (1 - T,)  <  (1 - ~,)(1  - T,) 
where  T,  =  dr,+  (;/z)T,  is the marginal  tax rate on  equity income. 
d +  ilz 
Expressions  (17)  and  (18)  imply that if the after-tax income  from  bonds 
exceeds  the after-tax i  ncome  from equity,  investors prefer debt f i  nance. 
Given reasonable  values  of d,  T,,  T,,  and  T,,  (17)  is likely to  be 
the case  and  will be  a~sumed.~  Condition (17)  in  conjunction with a cost to 
debt  a(X)b  results in  an  optimal  X:  0  <  X < 
The  firm's problem leads  to  the following Hamiltonian formulation: 
where  q'and Q  are the costate variables associated with K and  b, 
respectively.  Expressions  (20)  through  (23)  are the optimal i  ty conditions for 
the firm. 
(24)  (TVC)  lim  ptqtKt =  0 =  lim  ptQtbt 
t-  t- 
-Sh  T(~>dz 
where  p,  =  e Expression  (21)  states that marginal  q differs from one  by  the after-tax 
decline in  real cash  flow due  to  installation costs and  implies that the 
investment  rate is  an  increasing function of  marginal  q.  Expression  (22)  is 
the arbitrage condition that the shadow  return from holding capital must  equal 
the required return on  capital,  (r +  6)q.  Expression  (22)  can  be 
integrated subject to  the  transversality condition (24)  to  obtain 
Thus,  q equals  the present discounted sum  of  after-tax marginal products 
of  a  unit of  capital  installed at time t.  Since r depends  on  tax rates and 
the debt cost,  so  does  q.  Expression  (23)  states the relation between  X, 
8,  and  T,  when  the firm  chooses  X so as  to  minimize r.  Since  there 
is  no  equity issue,  X is adjusted by  varying the b  versus  RE  financing mix. 
Having chosen  the path of the capital stock,  employment,  and  the 
debt-to-equi  ty  ratio,  the  firm  has  maximized  Vt=o,  and  the resulting initial 
share  price is  determined  by  the condition btZo  +  zt,oEt=o  =  VtZo. 
C.  Government 
The  government  is  characterized by an  income  statement  identity: 
(26)  r,  [wl +  sb  +  dzEl +  T,;E  +  T,[Y  - wl  - q(I,K)  -  sbl + r =  g. 
The  government  sets T,,  T,,  T,,  and  g.  The  lump  sum  tax  T 
varies so as  to  satisfy the identity.  Although T adjusts endogenously,  the 
impact of a change  in  T  is ignored in  the dynamic  analysis that follows 
because  individual  consumers  take  T  as  given parametrically. IV.  Perfect Foresight Equilibrium 
A  perfect foresight equilibrium is  a sequence  of  prices and  quantities for 
which notional demands  and  suppl  ies for bonds  and  equities are equal  in  the 
present and  future.  Given  the optimality conditions of consumers  and  firms 
and  the government  income  statement  identity,  expressions  (27)-(32)  determine 
the sequence  of variables,  {Kt,  ct),  t=[O,  a). 
Here I  have  simp1  ified the model  by setting T,  =  TC =  0. I  a1 so 
assume  that employment  is  given exogenously.  Together  with expression  (201, 
this is  analogous  to  assuming  that the real wage  adjusts  to  equilibrate the 
labor market.  So,  condition  (20)  is not needed  below.  Expression  (28)  is  a 
restatement of the material balance constraint which  uses  the facts:  b = 
CXl(1  +  XIIV,  V =  qK. 
Expression  (31)  gives  the optimal debt-to-equity ratio and  indicates that 
a higher interest rate or  corporate  tax rate means  a higher debt-to-equity 
ratio as  the value of the interest deduction rises.  To  see  that (31)  implies 
an optimal X,  derive expression  (33)  from expression  (32)  for given T, 
and 8. Figure 1  shows  how  expression  (33)  implies that an  increase  in  T,  from T,O 
to  .rPl  leads  to  an  increase  in  the optimal  X  from Xz  to 1:. 
An  increase  in  T,  makes  a higher X  optimal.  Expressions  (31)  and 
(32)  together  show  that the minimized cost of capital  is  equal  to 
(34)  r=8-  ~'(x)x'. 
The  decrease  in the cost of capital due  to  an  increase  in  T,  is indicated 
by  the T,I  line in  figure 1.  However,  expression (28)  indicates that an 
increase  in  the debt-to-equity ratio,  which reduces  the cost of capital,  may 
increase the debt  cost.  The  change  in  a(X)b  depends  on  the change  in  X, 
the response  of q,  and  the response  of  K.  These  relationships are examined 
below. 
V.  Steady  State and  Comparative  Results 
In  the  steady  state,  K =  0 and  c = 0.  The  first condition implies that 
I  =  6K  and  thus  IIK  =  6.  The  second  impl  ies that 8  =  B:  the steady 
state interest rate is the rate of time preference of consumers.  The 
condition that 8  =  B,  together with (301,  impl  ies that q =  0.  The 
debt-to-equi  ty ratio  must  a1  so be  constant  in  the steady  state.  This  impl  ies 
that d=B.  Expressions  (35)-(38)  describe the steady  state: - 14 - 
Figure 1 
The  Effect of an  Increase  in  T,  on  the Cost of Capital  (TI The  impact of increasing the corporate  tax rate is  given by: 
where  dq  = -  Ch(S)+6h1(6>1  <  0,  @ = a  @  <  0,  a  <  0,  and 
dz  P  dzP  dX  dzP  dl 
The  sign of  dK/dzp  is  unclear because  of two  competing effects. 
First,  the  increase  in  T,  reduces  the cost of capital by making  a greater 
X  optimal.  This  is  clear from expression  (34).  Second,  the reduction in 
the after-tax return from a unit of capital reduces  steady  state q.  The  sign 
of  dc/dzp is also unclear.  In  the absence  of the agency  cost,  dc/d~p 
would  be  -CF,-6-h(6)I  dK/dzP.  Then  the requirement for steady  state 
c  to  change  in  the same  direction as  K would  be:  FK-6-h(6)6  <  0.  Here, 
the analogous  version is FK-6-h(6>6-AtX>H(  <  0,  where  A(X>H(  )  is 
the per-unit of capital agency  cost.  This  condition,  however,  is  not 
sufficient for steady  state K  and  c  to  move  in  the same  direction,  since  the 
increase in  zP  also affects X,  q,  and  K.  Note  that dc/d~p  can  be 
written as: 
where  the  last three terms  equal  dEa(X>bl/dz,.  Although X will 
increase,  total agency  costs may  fall, since  the value of the firm  may  fall. VI.  Dynamic  Behavior 
As  is  well known,  in  dynamic  rational-expectations models,  endogenous 
variables may  overshoot  the new  steady  state.  Consequently,  it  is  useful  to 
di  st  i  ngui  sh  between  s hort-run and  1  ong-run responses  to  pol i  cy changes.  In 
this section I  describe the movement  of the  system about  the  steady  state in 
response  to  an  unanticipated increase  in  T,.  The  movement  can  be 
described by changes  in the rate of investment,  x  =  IIK, and  the capital 
stock.  This simplification recognizes  that the cost of capital  varies with 
the  interest rate and  the debt-to-equity ratio,  both of which  vary with the 
rate of  change  of consumption and  marginal  utility.  The  following system  is 
derived in  appendix  B by  expanding  the system described by  expressions 
(27)-(32)  about  the steady  state: 
(47)  C1  =  1 +  H(G,T,)KA'~K  Ucc 
zE  Uc 
(42) 
Here I  have  made  use  of the following definitions:  1)  HO  =  l+(l-~,)q,  =  q; 
2) HI0  =  dHO1dx;  3)  r'  =  drlde;  4)  A'(>  =  dA(X)/dX;  and  5)  h'0  =  dh(x)/dx. 
X~X* 
KIK* 
-  - 
A1  n2 
K  o 
X-X* 
K-K* Since  investment (I)  can  change  instantaneously,  x  is the "jump"  variable 
for  which discontinuities can  occur.  Since K is  predetermined while x depends 
on  the future path of the  system,  in  order for the  system to  be  stable,  there 
must  be  one  positive and  one  negative eigenvalue  for the matrix in (42).  This 
condition assures me  of a jump  onto the stable arm of the system  in  its 
movement  toward  the new  steady  state.  To  assure  this stability I  assume  that: 
(48)  det  <  0,  -Kn2  <  0,  n2 >  0. 
From  (43)-(471,  it  is  clear that expression (49)  is sufficient for (48)  to 
hol  d. 
(49)  C1  >  0 
The  second  term in  C1 reflects that an  increase  in  consumption 
accompanies  a  rising interest rate and  an  increase in  equity values.  An 
increase  in  equity values  reduces  the rate of change  of the debt-to-equi  ty 
ratio,  thus  reducing the rate of change  of the debt  cost.  Condition  (49) 
states that the direct effect of  rising consumption  on  aggregate  demand 
outweighs  the indirect effect operating through  the debt  cost.  So,  to  assure 
C1  >  0, I  assume  that the rate of change  of demand  for goods  varies 
positively with the rate of change  of consumption. 
Note  that for the stable eigenvalue  Q <  0 and  the corresponding 
eigenvector,  (XI,  X2I1, Expression (50)  imp1  ies that the movement  of x and K from their steady 
state values  can be  described by expression  (51): 
(51)  xt - x*  =  ylw2eat,  Kt - K*  =  Y,(n - v1)eQt. 
Y1 is a constant determined  from the fact that K remains  fixed at the 
time of  the announcement  and  implementation of  an  unanticipated change  in 
2,.  Having determined Yl  as  described in  appendix  B,  the movements  of 
x and K  about  the steady  state are described by expressions  (52)  and  (53). 
(52)  xt - x*  =  (-  dK/d~,)d~,w~e'~/(Q  - w,) 
(53)  Kt - K*  =  (-  dK/d~,)d~,e~' 
These  imply xt - x  ZO  as  dK/d-~,  ZO.  In  other words,  if the steady  state 
capital stock increases,  investment  is  above  its steady  state value during the 
adjustment period.  In  fact,  x must  immediately increase at time t =  0.  The 
jump i  s computed  as : 
VII.  Dynamic  Relationships Between  Tobin's  q,  the Debt-to-Equity Ratio,  and 
the Rate of  Investment 
Because  the movements  of  q  and  x  are closely related by expression  (211, 
on  the stable adjustment  path,  sign [;I  =  sign  Cql.  The  new  steady  state 
value of q  wi  11  be  lower,  since zP  has  increased. 
Initially, however,  q  and  x may  jump  in  different directions.  The 
increase in  the rate at which current returns are taxed  tends  to  decrease  q  at 
the time of  the announcement.  The  movement  of  q  along the stable arm can  be 
described by expresssion  (561,  where  q:  is the new  steady state value: The  jump  in  q at t =  0  is 
If  steady  state K increases,  q may  either rise or fall  initially. 
However,  if steady  state K falls,  q must  immediately  fall.  These  results are 
depicted in  figure 2. 
The  initial movement  in  X  can  be  inferred directly from the  jump  in  q 
using the following relations:  a)  X =  b/zE,  b)  V  =  b +  zE,  c)  V  =  qK.  The 
variables b,  E,  and  K are predetermined.  These  imply that the  jump  in.  X is 
opposite  in sign to that of  q.  An  increase  in the market value of existing 
capital  will  be  immediately reflected in  a higher price of equity and  a lower 
debt-to-equity ratio. 
Once  this initial adjustment  has  been made,  however,  subsequent movements 
in  X are  govern,ed by  relation (31):  82,  =  a(X)  +  al(X)X(l  +  XI.  In 
fact,  the  initial reaction of the interest rate is  also governed  by  (31). 
Thus,  X and  8  may  initially jump  in  opposite directions.  To  demonstrate 
the dynamics  of these  relations,  two possible cases  are examined  below. 
Case I: dK/d~, >  0. 
As  noted above,  x will immediately  increase  while the movement  of  q is 
unclear.  If q immediately increases,  then the debt-to-equity ratio drops. 
Then,  from (311,  in  order  to  be  on  the stable path,  the interest rate must 
initially fall, given the higher T,.  When  the interest rate is  below  6, 
consumption  is  falling.  This  is seen  from expresssion  (27): As  the interest rate rises toward  O,  X rises toward  its higher  steady  state 
level.  The  sign of the initial change  in c is indeterminate,  as  is the sign 
of  the comparative  static result,  because  of the presence of debt  costs  that 
may  move  in the opposite direction of the capital  stock.  The  former  case  is 
depicted in  figure 3. 
Case  11:  dK/dr,  <  0. 
Here  the initial impact  on  q is clear.  Both  the drop in investment  and 
the higher  tax rate require q  to  fall.  In this case,  it  is clear that the new 
steady  state firm value  will be  lower.  As  a result of the change  in  T,, 
the relationship between  X and  8  has  been  altered,  and  the direction of 
the  jump  in  8  is indeterminate.  Two  possibilities are pictured in figure 
4.  The  ambiguity regarding the path of  X and  8  in  figure 4  can  be 
resolved by restricting the response  of the system  to  the change  in  T,. 
Expressions  (87)  and  (88)  in  appendix  B imply expression  (58): 
Here  IT,  >  0 and  C1  >  0 imply that if dK/d~, >  0,  as  K increases 
toward  the new  steady  state,  c  >  0.  The  sign of IT,  =  B2/B1  can  be 
determined  through inspection of B2.  B2 is the response of q  to  an 
a 
increase in  x.  If an  increase in  the level of investment decreases  x,  q  will 
also decrease.  This  is  clear from expression  (29)  and  will  be  assumed, 
implying n, <  0. Figure  3 
The  Effect of an  Increase  in T,  on  q,  X, x,  and  8 
When  dK/d~,  >  0  and  q,-q*  1 ,,,  >  0 Figure  4 
The  Effect of an  Increase in T,  on  q, A,  x,  and  8 
When  dK/dr,  and  q,-q*  1 t=o  >  0 The  first term in  the coefficient for (x - x*)  in  expression  (58) 
represents  the response  of  excess  supply of goods  to  an  increase  in  K.  This 
will be  assumed  positive,  assuring us  that (c - c*)  varies positively with 
(x-x*).  Thus,  (58)  implies that if dK/d~, <  0, (c - c*)  >  0.  This,  in 
turn,  tells us  that path A  is the appropriate path from figure 4. 
VIII.  The  Distinction Between  the Cost of Capital  and  the Interest Rate 
This model  predicts  that the interest rate and  the debt-to-equity ratio 
are positively correlated.  However,  this is  not the result of  bankruptcy 
risk, but rather the interest deduction for debt.  While  the cost of capital 
is  positively correlated with the debt-to-equity ratio,  the ratio between  the 
cost of capital and  the  interest rate is  given by  expression  (34). 
(34)  r  =  8-  a1(X)X2. 
Since  the debt-to-equity ratio  rises with the interest rate,  the gap 
between  the cost of capital and  the  interest rate also rises with 8.  This 
implies  that models  that use  the  interest rate as  the discount rate overstate 
the cost of capital by  an  increasing amount  as  the interest rate rises.  We 
would  expect  that these models  would  understate  investment. 
Using expressions  (231,  (341,  and  (581,  it  is straightforward to show  how 
the gap  between  r  and  8 varies.  Expressions  (23)  and  (34)  imply: 
Together  with (581,  (59)  implies: Given  the assumptions  above,  if dK/d~, >  0,  dCT  - 81  <  0.  Since 
r - 8  =  -a1(X)X2  <  0, if the capital  stock  is  rising,  the absolute 
value of  the gap  between  the cost of  capital .and  the  interest rate is  rising. 
IX.  Summary 
Previous q models  of investment have  imp1  ici  tly  assumed  that financial 
decisions have  no  impact on  the cost of the capital.  Here  we  show  how 
financial  structure affects the cost of capital and  the time paths of 
investment,  q and  X.  In  this paper,  the presence  of a debt cost together 
with a tax code  that favors debt results in  an  optimal  debt-to-equi  ty ratio 
that covaries  with the interest rate.  We  find that q is still a  "sufficient 
statistic" for investment,  although financial  structure has  real effects.  In 
addition,  the gap  between  the cost of capital  and  the interest rate covaries 
with interest rates and  financial  structure.  As  the debt-to-equity ratio 
rises,  however,  the increase  in  the cost of debt reduces  the amount  of  output 
avai 1  able for consumption or investment. 
The  analysis  implies  that models  that ignore the endogenous  adjustment of 
f i  nanciai structure wi  11  systematical  ly  err in  predicting the response  of 
investment  to  changes  in  tax rates or interest rates.  For  example,  a change 
in  the corporate tax rate affects both the cost of  capital and  the gap  between 
the cost of capital and  the interest rate.  In  addition,  the presence of  real 
costs to  financial  structure may  imply that the capital  stock would  decline in 
spite of a lower  cost of  capital. Appendix  A 
Here I  derive the appropriate form  for the cost of  capital through  the use 
of the constraints  (7)-(12)  and  the assumed  firm  objective:  maximization of 
V(0).  First,  use  (8)  and  (9)  to  write 
A  y  - w  - 1,Kl  - T) =  (s(l - T,)  +  a(X))b  +  dzE  +  RE. 
*  , 
Note  that V  =  b +  zE  implies 
Expressions  (10)  and  (B1)  imply  (83): 
where  (y - wC  - *(I,K))(l  - r,)  - I  is  defined as  Y,  the real cash 
flow of the  firm.  Using  (61,  (A41  can  be  rewritten as 
Using the definition of 1,  (A51  can  be  written as 
Finally,  defining the cost of capital r  as 
(A61  can  be  written as 
which  is  a  linear differential equation in  V  that can  be  integrated to  show 
that r  is  the discount factor  which maintains  the equality between  the 
integral in  expression  (13)  and  bt=o  +  Z,=~E,=,. Appendix  B 
Here I  derive expressions  (42)-(47)  of the text by  expanding  the system 
(271432)  about  the steady  state.  First note that (29)  implies 
where  H(x,T,>  =  1  +  (1-2,)  [h(x)  +  hl(x)l and  H'(x,T,)  =  dH(  )/dx. 
Together  with (301,  this implies 
Since  €3  =  I3  - Uccc/Uc, in  order for  (B2)  to  yield a relation for x, I 
require an  expression for ;.  An  expression for ;  can  be  derived from (28). 
Take  the time derivative of (28): 
Here I  have  used  the fact that K =  K(x-6)  and I  =  xK.  The  last term on 
the right is an  expression for qKdCA(X>l/dt  that makes  use of the following 
facts: These  yield the following expression for ;: 
. 
Now  linearize (2)  about  the steady  state to  obtain an  expression for  (x - x*): 
where  Al  =  (x,~,),  A2  =  (r  +  &)H(X,T~)  - (1 - T~)(FK  +  xZh'(x)) 
and,  since all coefficients are evaluated at the  steady  state, 
A,  =  q =  0.  So  we  have: 
. 
- H(  )rt(-ucc~/uc)(~  -  CI*). 
From  (B4) I  derive: 
This  expression makes  use  of the fact that in  the steady state 
x-6  =  x =  d-8  =  0.  d-8  =  0  stems  from the requirement that in the steady 
state,  X =  0,  and  thus  z/z  =  0.  This  implies that 8  =  8 =  d.  The 
resulting expression for (x 1  x*)  is: 
(88)  (x 1  x*)  =  rl(x - x*)  +n2(K- K*),  where rl  and  n2 are 
defined  as  in  the text. 
In  this section the determination of the constant Y, in  expression 
(51)  in  the  text is  described.  Expressions  (89)-(811)  are implied by  the fact that capital  stock remains  fixed at the time of the announced  change,  but 
eventually changes  by  (dK/d~,) d~,. 
(B9)  Kt - Kl  1  t,o  =  K*  - K:  =  (-dK/dz,)d~, 
(B10)  Kt - Kl I  t=o =  YltQ - IT,  =  (-dK/d~,)d~, 
(B11)  Y1 =  (-dKld~,)d~,/(Q - nl) Footnotes 
1.  As  an  example  of  more  recent developments,  Bernanke  and  Gertler  (1986) 
have  incorporated fi  nanci  a1  structure into a stochastic  general 
equilibrium model. 
2.  Chirinko (1  987)  and  Hayashi  (1985)  have  incorporated financial structure 
into q frameworks.  Chirinko,  however,  ignores  tax effects and 
investigates  whether  the debt versus  equity choice  can  explain the poor 
performance  of q,  defined as  the market  value of equity divided by  the 
replacement  value of capital .  The  analysi  s  of this paper,  as  do others, 
defines  q  as  the market  value of debt and  equity divided .by  the 
replacement  cost of capital.  Utilizing a partial equilibrium framework, 
Hayashi  (1985)  shows  how  the firm's choice of financial policy depends  on 
the  level of  profits relative to investment.  He  finds that only when 
incremental  investment  is  entirely debt-financed is the link between  q and 
investment  broken.  Chirinko and  King  (1985)  take  into account  the role of 
debt  in  the response  of investment  by  equity-maximizing  firms to  changes  in 
inflation. 
3.  A  series of articles (see  Auerbach  C19831  for  a review)  has  concluded  that 
bankruptcy  risk and  tax  rates that vary across  investors and  types of 
income  can  lead to  a determinate  debt-to-equi  ty ratio and  a cost of  capital 
that varies  with the debt-to-equity ratio.  However,  if with bankruptcy 
risk a firm's decisions  influence the  implicit prices of the Arrow-Debreu 
state contingent commodities,  the cost of  capital  is  not well-defined. 
4.  If a(X>b were  treated as  a deduction from taxable income  or as  a cost 
that reduced  taxable revenue,  the  form for the optimal  cost of  capital 
would  be  somewhat  different.  To  see  this,  replace  (14)  by  the following: 
and  proceed  as  in appendix  B.  The  resulting expression for r is 
At  the optimal  debt-to-equity ratio,  the condition that dT/dX  =  0 
implies that 
which  yields r  =  8  -  (l--t,)~~a'(~).  It  can  be  shown  that an 
increase  in  2,  sti  11  wi  11  decrease  the  steady  state cost of capital  . 
5.  The  formulation of the adjustment cost  implies a production function of 
the form G(B,K,I)  with Ga  >  0,  GK  <  0,  GI<O,  GKK  <  0, 
GnQ<O and  G(I,K,I)  homogeneous  of  degree  one.  Then  with the 
assumption  that Gal =  0,  G(8,K,I)  can  be  written as  G(Q,K,I)  = 
F(K,Q> - q(I,K). 6.  Chirinko (1982)  estimates  TC  at .033  when  rates applicable to various 
investor classes are weighted by  transactions shares.  The  estimate when 
weights reflect SEC  market  value data is .031.  Feldstein,  Poterba,  and 
Dicks-Mireaux  (1981)  estimate zc at .083.  While Gordon  and  Malkiel 
(1981)  argue  that the rate on  dividend and  interest income  should be 
approximately equal  for relevant investors,  other researchers disagree. 
Feldstein,  Poterba,  and  Dicks-Mireaux  estimate the dividend tax rate at 
.349  in  1979,  and  estimate the tax rate on  interest income  at .317. 
Chirinko estimates  the dividend tax rate at .I68 with transactions 
weights,  and  .278  when  rates are weighted by market  shares.  Gordon  and 
Malkiel estimate the dividend and  interest income  tax rate at .44.  The 
federal corporate tax rate is .48.  Feldstein,  Poterba,  and  Dicks-Mireaux 
estimate  the corporate tax rate inclusive of state and  local  government 
corporate  taxes  at .472. References 
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